Countering the Politics of Fear - Reframing Threat Narratives about Refugees in Hungary by Demjén, Judit Eszter
RLI Working Paper No. 58
Countering the Politics of Fear - Reframing Threat 
Narratives about Refugees in Hungary
Judit Eszter Demjén




This paper applies the Discourse Historical Approach to examine how a text published by a Hungarian 
human rights NGO constructs an alternative discourse to the ‘Othering’ right-wing populist discourse on 
refugees, which capitalises on the threat narratives of the securitisation of migration. The research draws 
on literature about right-wing populism, the securitisation of migration – including the ‘war on terrorism’ 
– the impact of securitisation policies and right-wing populist rhetoric on stoking fears among the public, 
as well as the concepts and assumptions underlying human rights advocacy in challenging the status quo. 
Furthermore, Viktor Orbán’s anti-migration campaigns in relation to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ are outlined, 
along with the repercussions these have had on refugee protection, civil society, and public attitudes 
towards refugees and immigrants in Hungary. The analysis shows that three building blocks carry the 
articulation of the NGO’s alternative discourse and then explores what can be learned from these. The 
NGO’s discourse is arguably constructed differently to how human rights advocates ‘traditionally’ frame 
refugee rights and counter threat narratives, therefore, it may provide tools to initiate a more constructive 
public dialogue on the topic of perceived threats associated with refugees.
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1. Introduction
Across Europe, populist parties are on the rise.1 However, the ruling right-wing populist-nationalist2 party 
in Hungary, FIDESZ, seems to be quite exceptional, as it managed to amass enough power to systematically 
change the political system during the course of the last decade.3 FIDESZ has implemented controversial 
legislative reforms to control the media, change the electoral system, and impose restrictions on NGOs,4 
while opposition parties are in disarray and the EU’s structural limitations hamper efforts to reinstate 
checks-and-balances on executive power.5 Thus, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán’s hegemony 
remains under-challenged.6 Taking advantage of the 2015 refugee influx, when over one million displaced 
persons arrived in the EU, Orbán stoked anti-immigrant sentiments through billboard campaigns, ‘national 
consultations’, and new policies flouting national and international legal obligations.7 These were under-
pinned by a nativist, xenophobic rhetoric, portraying refugees and immigrants as dangerous threats to the 
nation and to Christian values,8 while positioning the government as the defender of Hungary against the 
EU, which imposes refugees on Europe.9 In a polarised context like Hungary’s, where 76% of the surveyed 
public believes refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism,10 it is difficult yet important to gauge how to 
counter threat narratives about refugees to generate a more measured and constructive public dialogue 
on the topic because “while there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity, migra-
tion policies that […] violate human rights may in fact create conditions conducive to terrorism.”11
In 2017, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), a human rights NGO held a series of public talks en-
titled: Our Neighbour, the Refugee and published ‘thesis collections’ online to accompany the events. The 
topics chosen for the talks addressed public fears related to the influx of foreigners arriving in Hungary. 
Rather than contesting the factual accuracy of the Hungarian government’s ‘Othering’ right-wing populist 
discourse on refugees, which capitalises on the threat narratives of the securitisation of migration, HCLU 
constructed an alternative discourse, which counters some of the arguments of this threat-based discourse 
by situating components of these arguments within a human rights framework. HCLU argues that the State 
has a duty to respect and uphold human rights – this fiduciary obligation to the ruled stems from the insti-
tutional assumption of sovereign powers and the right to rule.12 
This paper applies the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to answer the question of how HCLU’s alterna-
tive discourse is constructed and what can be learned from such an alternative articulation. I argue that the 
discourse is constructed in a manner that is different to how human rights advocates ‘traditionally’ frame 
refugee rights, as it counters threat narratives and the politics of fear propagated through right-wing pop-
ulist discourse on immigration and refugees as well as makes human rights relevant for ‘regular’ citizens. 
Therefore, the building blocks of the discourse may provide various options to pave the way to a more 
nuanced and constructive public dialogue about perceived threats related to refugees in Europe. Academ-
ically, this research draws on theoretical knowledge about populism and the securitisation of migration 
while building on literature about human rights communication with an empirical example from Hungary. 
Furthermore, as the DHA is predominantly applied to analyse texts that ‘warrant critique’, this study con-
tributes to the few studies that apply the DHA to analyse texts, which counter the critiqued text.
1 Katsambekis, ‘The populist surge in post-democratic times: theoretical and political challenges’ (2017) 88(2) TPQ, 202.
2 de Cleen, ‘Populism and Nationalism’ in Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, and Ostiguy, (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism 
(OUP, 2017) 353.
3  Stanley, ‘Populism in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017) 159. 
4 Sargentini, Report: On a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence 
of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, A8-0250/2018 (European Parliament, 2018).
5  Batory, ‘Populists in government? Hungary’s ”system of national cooperation”’ (2016) 23(2) Democratization 299; Jenne and Mudde, 
‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn - Can Outsiders Help?’ (2012) 23(3) JD 148-9.
6  Katsambekis (n1) 203.
7  Goździak, ‘Using Fear of the “Other,” Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity’ (MPIE, 2019).
8  Ignatieff, ‘The Refugee as Invasive Other’ (2017) 84(1) SR 223.
9  Pelinka, ‘Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology’ in Wodak, Khosravinik, and Mral (eds) Right-Wing Populism in 
Europe: Politics and Discourse (Bloomsbury, 2013) 8.
10  Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs (Pew Research Center, 2016).
11  UNOHCHR, Refugees and terrorism: “No evidence of risk” – New report by UN expert on counter-terrorism 21.10.2016.
12  Weinrib, ‘Sovereignty as a Right and as a Duty: Kant’s Theory of the State’ in Finkelstein and Skerker (eds) Sovereignty and the New 
Executive Authority (OUP, 2017); Criddle and Fox-Decent, ‘Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 34 HRQ 40.
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Regarding referential reflexivity,13 it should be noted that I am a Hungarian citizen with a professional back-
ground in advocating for refugee rights, and therefore my stance towards this topic of research is not 
completely neutral. However, I have strived to consider and reflect on different positionalities to avoid in-
troducing bias and to ensure that the taken-for-granted assumptions of the discourse under analysis have 
been examined to highlight that these do not have claims to neutrality. At the same time, the boundaries 
of my empathy towards other positionalities are drawn by what is ethically (un)acceptable, for example 
racism and fear mongering. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that, as a researcher, I am not outside 
the societal hierarchy of power and status – naming my ‘critical’ approach is with the intention to make my 
position, research interest, and values clear and their criteria transparent.14
13  Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (SAGE, 2014) 606.
14  Wodak and Meyer, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology’ in Wodak and Meyer (eds) Methods for Criti-
cal Discourse Analysis (SAGE, 2001) 7,18.
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2. Right-Wing Populism in Europe
Scholarly debates regarding the definition of populism can be grouped broadly into three approaches: 
the ideational, the political-strategic, and the socio-cultural.15 The ideational approach to populism is argu-
ably the most widely used, especially by scholars of European populism, and is particularly relevant in the 
context of right-wing populism in Hungary, though it may also apply to left-wing populism.16 It defines 
populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”17 This understanding of populism entails 
four key concepts: ideology, the people, general will, and the elite. Ideologies help us make sense of po-
litical and social worlds, as systems of thought that ‘decontest’ concepts by legitimating one meaning and 
delegitimising others.18 When right-wing populists claim to speak in the name of ‘the people’ they bring 
into being an ethnically and culturally homogenous, stable, and coherent native community, that associ-
ates its wellbeing to the exclusion of alien ‘Others’.19 ‘The people’s’ ‘general will’ justifies all their actions since 
they are merely expressions of ‘the people’s will’. 
Populism’s origins can be traced back to the 1960s when working-class and religious voter support for es-
tablished centre-left and centre-right parties weakened due to deindustrialisation and a significant decline 
in religious observance.20 The 1980s and 90s saw mainstream parties turn towards an elite consensus call-
ing for integration through the EU, multi-cultural/ethnic societies, and neoliberal economic reforms – this 
came with the transfers of authority to supranational entities and unelected officials.21 In Eastern Europe, 
top-down post-communist transition reforms created multiple resentments and uncertainties, as well as 
an eventual ‘transition fatigue’, which set the stage for populists’ Eurosceptic appeals coupled with simple 
and convincing “narratives of blame, solidarity, and moral solace”.22 Thus, the surge in populism can be con-
ceived as “an illiberal democratic response to decades of undemocratic liberal policies.”23
In nationalist right-wing populist discourse, two out-groups are created: on the one hand, ‘the elite’, such as 
the governing parties, intellectuals, NGOs, the EU or the United Nations. On the other hand, those who are 
framed to pose a danger, such as refugees, migrants, Muslims, Roma, and other minorities.24 In the ‘worst 
case’ there are alliances and conspiracies between these two groups, leading ‘the elite’ to promote (Muslim) 
immigration and a multicultural society, thus endangering the nation’s and/or continent’s identity.25 While 
the content of Islamophobic discourse is similar across Europe, what is particular about East Central Europe 
is the degree to which its political expression is reflected in national consensus, despite the Muslim pop-
ulations in the region being quite small, and how it undermines resistance by the judiciary, human rights 
organisations, and the media, as well as how it is used to negotiate a new place for the formerly socialist 
Member States of the EU.26 Pronounced levels of Islamophobia in East-Central Europe must also be read as 
articulations that buttress the region’s Europeanness, and not solely as being about what Muslim subjec-
tivities do or what Islam is about.27 
 
15  Rovira Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, and Ostiguy, ‘Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art’, (Oxford Hand-
book of Populism, 2017) 14-15.
16  Katsambekis (n1) 205.
17  Mudde, ‘Populism: An Ideational Approach’ (Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017) 29.
18  Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2003) 3, 53-54.
19  Ochoa Espejo, ‘Populism and the Idea of the People’, (Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017) 620,624-5.
20  Mudde, ‘Europe’s Populist Surge: A Long Time in the Making’ (2016) 95(6) FA 26-27.
21  Ibid, 27.
22  Stanley, ‘Populism in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017) 143-144,147.
23  Mudde, (n20) 30.
24  Wodak, ‘The “Establishment”, the “Élites”, and the “People” – Who’s who?’ (2017) 16(4) JLP 3,6.
25  Pelinka (n9) 8.
26  Kalmar, ‘Islamophobia in the East of the European Union: an introduction’ (2018) 52(5) PP 389.
27  Sayyid, ‘Islamophobia and the Europeanness of the other Europe’ (2018) 52(5) PP 431-432.
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3. Securitisation of Migration 
The concept of ‘securitisation’ is explored through the constructivist approach developed by Buzan, Wæver, 
and de Wilde, whereby a topic of ‘normal politics’ becomes an issue of security not by virtue of it being an 
objective threat, but by political actors and the State’s elites presenting it though a rhetoric of existential 
threat.28 The triggering of crises justifies measures outside established political procedures. In addition to 
such ‘speech acts’, scholars such as Bigo and Balzacq argue that bureaucratic procedures, practices of se-
curity professionals, and the evolving application of new technologies also play a role in the securitisation 
process.29 
After World War II, migration was seen as a means to European economic reconstruction and post-war 
immigrants’ legal status was not politically sensitive or related to security.30 However, following the Schen-
gen Treaties, the gradual implementation of the 1987 Single European Act to lift internal borders led to a 
perceived need for increased security at the external borders of the EU.31 Following the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty, European migration policy took on a security dimension, linking asylum and immigration with ille-
gal immigration, organised crime, and terrorism.32 Although policymakers claimed that the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System would become a common area of protection and solidarity, it is clear that migration 
control prevails over the need for protection. The EU’s ‘migration management’ has systematically made 
movement and access for migrants and refugees more difficult, through visa restrictions, return policies, 
‘safe third country’ agreements, border patrol agencies,33 and emergency narratives that enable forceful 
direct intervention.34 This securitising policy response erodes the integrity of refugee protection,35 blurring 
the distinction between conceptually different categories of migrants, absorbing them into a “single polic-
ing-repression scheme”.36
The ‘war against terrorism’ which ensued after 9/11 has also lent a new political significance to the border 
space, which is portrayed as constantly being ‘violated’ and therefore requires fortification and control.37 
Indeed, State sovereignty is challenged by the asylum seeker as the only foreigner who has the right under 
international law to breach the security of the border, which is another reason to keep forced migrants 
from arriving at the border in the first place.38 In response to the 2015-16 terrorist attacks in Europe, many 
EU Member States adopted (emergency) counter-terrorism measures, which have eroded the rule of law, 
weakened judicial controls, and strengthened executive powers.39 This context fuelled public fears, with 
many believing that incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism,40 and that the EU’s external 
borders are an important security concern.41 Scrutiny of the ‘war against terrorism’ reveals how this am-
biguous campaign has enabled political actors to frame immigration and asylum in security terms.42 Such 
framing has also justified increased surveillance and restrictions on citizens’ civil and political rights in the 
name of national security.43 
Anti-immigration discourses that feed into the rhetoric of the securitisation of migration tend to be ar-
ticulated around four main axes: identitarian/societal, socio-economic, criminological/securitarian, and po-
28  Karyotis, ‘European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11 – The security-migration nexus’ (2007) 20(1) Innovation 2-3.
29  Bourbeau, The Securitisation of Migration - A study of movement and order (Routledge, 2011); Balzacq, Securitisation Theory - How Securi-
ty Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, 2011) 16-17.
30  Karyotis (n28) 3; Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38(5) JCMS 753-754.
31  Gibney, ‘Security and the Ethics of Asylum after 11 September’ (2002) 13 FMR 40; Léonard, ‘EU Border security and migration into the 
European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices’ (2010) 19(2) ES.
32  Karyotis (n28) 5.
33  Szalai and Gőbl, Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary, WP, (CEU, 2015) 8.
34  Kinnval, ‘The Postcolonial has Moved into Europe: Bordering, Security and Ethno-Cultural Belonging’ (2016) 54(1) JCMS 162.
35  Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking law to power: the war against terrorism and human rights’ (2003) 14(2), EJIL 259.
36  Karyotis (n28) 12; Léonard (n31) 232.
37  Ibrahim and Howarth, ‘Communicating the ‘migrant’ other as risk: space, EU and expanding borders’ (2018) 21(12) JRR 1466.
38  Guild, ‘International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001’ (2003) 
8(3) EFAR 234-235.
39  Amnesty International, Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe, (2017) 6.
40  European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 464b – Europeans’ attitudes towards security, (EU, 2017) 151.
41  Wike et al. (n10) 3.
42  Gibney (n31).
43  Lamer, ‘From sleepwalking into surveillance societies to drifting into permanent securitisation: Mass surveillance, security and human 
rights in Europe’ (2017) 1(2) GCHRJ.
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litical.44 Translating these axes into integrated threat theory,45 research and surveys have shown that the 
threats perceived by the public can be clustered around symbolic threats, relating to perceived differences 
in values, norms, and beliefs, and realistic threats, pertaining to competition over material and economic 
interests.46 Expectations with regards to how ‘the Other’ might behave and feelings of personal insecurity 
fall under negative stereotyping and intergroup anxiety.47 The degree to which people perceive these threats 
influences their attitudes towards restrictive migration policies.48 Discourses that build on these threat nar-
ratives reiterate the boundaries between ‘us’ and an inferior ‘them’, which harks back to the emergence 
of the modern nation state, that contained a Volk or people, whose group identity was defined over and 
against those ‘Others’ who did not belong and were different.49 Thus, it should be noted, that the racialisa-
tion of nationalism and insidious racism entrenched in the evolving structures of European society50 have 
also contributed to creating the possibility for the securitisation of migration and for threat narratives to 
persist and thrive. 
44  Ceyhan and Tsoukala, ‘The securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies’ (2002) 27 Alternatives 
23; Karyotis (n28) 8; Huysmans (n30) 758.
45  Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman, ‘Prejudice toward immigrants: An integrated threat theory’ (1999) 29(11) JASP.
46  Simonovits, ‘Realistic and Symbolic Threats - The Social Basis of Mass-Migration Related Fear in Contemporary Hungary’ (2016) 26(4) RS 
55.
47  Ibid.
48  Landmann, Gaschler, and Rohmann, ‘What is threatening about refugees?’ (2019) 49(7) EJSP; Egres, ‘Symbolic and Realistic Threats – 
Frame Analysis of Political and Media Discourses about Refugees and Migrants’ (2018) 40(3) SE. 
49  Oelgemőller, The Evolution of Migration Management in the Global North (Routledge, 2017) 3; MacMaster, Racism in Europe: 1870-2000 
(Palgrave, 2001) 6.
50  MacMaster (n49) 2.
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4. Refugees in Hungary
Hungary is ethnically and religiously relatively homogenous – the majority is Christian and the largest 
ethnic minority are Roma who account for 5-6% of the population, while immigration levels are well below 
those in Western European countries.51 In 2014, only 3% of Hungarians felt that immigration was the most 
important issue in their country – their main concerns were health and social security (21%), followed by 
government debt and pensions (13%).52 Orbán used the attack on Charlie Hebdo to distract from domestic 
issues and lay the foundations of his anti-migration campaigns, stating in the aftermath that economic im-
migration of minorities must be stopped as it only brings trouble.53 In May 2015, the government launched 
a ‘national consultation’ regarding immigration and terrorism,54 accompanied by a billboard campaign ap-
parently addressing immigrants, but written in Hungarian with statements like, “If you come to Hungary, 
you have to respect our culture/our laws/you cannot take away Hungarians’ jobs”, culminating in, “The 
people have chosen: the country needs to be defended.”55 Thus, the government’s securitisation rhetoric 
moved seamlessly from the economic axis to the security and identity axes.56
Orbán announced in June 2015 that Hungary would erect a 175km southern border fence, reflecting a 
threat frame of defence against an ‘invasion’ of a hostile out-group.57 In the course of 2015, around half a 
million migrants and asylum seekers crossed Hungary’s borders, the overwhelming majority of whom in-
tended to transit to Western or Northern Europe.58 In August 2015, the government forced people crossing 
the Serbian border to go to the Western train station in Budapest, keeping them there without information 
or basic amenities, which ‘conveniently’ created a visibly chaotic image of the dirty, unkempt, and poten-
tially dangerous ‘Other’.59 Civil society stepped in to provide assistance, promoting a counter-frame that 
de-securitised migration as a humanitarian issue and portrayed Hungarians as solidaristic people with bad 
leadership.60 In September 2015, the government criminalised irregular entry – for asylum seekers too, 
contravening Hungary’s international legal obligations – declaring a state of emergency due to mass mi-
gration.61 Since 2016, asylum seekers are systematically pushed back or detained in remote transit zones.62 
Further billboard campaigns in 2016 linking immigration to terrorist attacks and harassment stoked moral 
panic, playing on xenophobic attitudes, leading to a majority public that is dismissive towards any forced 
or voluntary migration to Hungary.63
Due to FIDESZ’s monopoly over traditional actors who could seek to contain its powers, NGOs and civil 
society movements are left to promote a de-securitisation frame although they often do not have enough 
social capital to be effective on their own.64 The government has steadily been eroding civil society since 
2011,65 but its NGO smear-campaign reached a zenith in June 2017, when a law was passed requiring for-
eign-funded NGOs to label themselves as such and register separately, so that the public knows they repre-
sent ‘foreign interests’ aiming to ‘ruin the reputation of Hungary’.66 While the 2017 NGO law has since been 
ruled as non-compliant with EU law,67 in June 2018 the parliament passed another controversial package 
of bills criminalising assistance to refugees and migrants, defined as activities that ‘promote illegal migra-
51  Simonovits, ‘The Public Perception of the Migration Crisis from the Hungarian Point of View’ in Glorius and Doomernik (ed) Geogra-
phies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities (Springer, 2020) 156.
52  European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 82 – Public Opinion in the European Union, (EU, 2014)
53  Traub, ‘The Fearmonger of Budapest’, Foreign Policy, 27.10.2015.
54  European Commission, Hungary: Government’s national consultation on immigration and terrorism creates widespread debate, European 
Website on Integration, 31.05.2015.
55  Howden, ‘The Manufacture of Hatred: Scapegoating Refugees in Central Europe’ News Deeply, 14.12.2016.
56  Szalai and Gőbl (n33) 20.
57  Ibid 21.
58  Howden (n55).
59  Szalai and Gőbl (n33) 23.
60  Ibid, 27.
61  Human Rights Watch, Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers, 19.09.2015.
62  Simonovits (n51) 171.
63  Ibid, 158.
64  Szalai and Gőbl (n33) 14; Batory (n5) 294.
65  Keller-Alánt, ‘Krétakör and the current status of NGOs in Hungary’, Krytyka Polityczna, 24.05.2016.
66  Hungarian Helsinki Committee and HCLU, Operation Starve & Strangle: How the Government Uses the Law to Repress Hungary’s Civic 
Spirit, 01.02.2018.
67  European Court of Justice, European Commission v Hungary, Case C-78/18, 18 June 2020 [143].
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tion’.68 Many of the NGOs that helped asylum seekers in 2015 are no longer operational due to this law.69 
68  ECRE, Hungary: Hungarian Helsinki Committee and Open Society Foundation file complaint against Hungary over legislation that crimina-
lises support for refugees, 28.09.2018.
69  Goździak (n7).
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5. The Human Rights Frame
While several approaches to countering right-wing populism have been identified, there seems to be con-
sensus that both the supply and demand side of populism must be addressed through meaningful en-
gagement that strikes a delicate balance between excluding intolerant forces that threaten democracy 
and maintaining an inclusive democracy.70 Dismissing populist constituencies reinforces their perception 
of ‘the elites’ ignoring ‘the people’ and does not address politicised issues within a democratic framework.71 
Thus, when confronted with a nationalist-populist xenophobic context and discourse that demands inter-
action, human rights advocates and defenders must reassess long-held assumptions, rethink their commu-
nications strategies72 and decide how to engage with the rhetoric of right-wing populists, if at all. 
Traditional ways of communicating about human rights in the context of forced migration include provid-
ing objective information and statistics, relating personal – often emotional – stories of individuals affected 
by human rights violations, and shaming the governments that violate human rights.73 These are different 
ways to (counter)frame issues, that is, to construct cognitive structures or schemata and select rhetorical 
lenses, with the intention of shaping how individuals perceive reality and process or interpret informa-
tion.74 A frame is typically successful when it resonates with people, and as long as it serves as the primary 
cognitive reference point, it continues to be effective even when it is being refuted with facts.75 To some 
extent, this is also due to how people resist new information that contradicts their beliefs or personal expe-
riences, regardless of the supporting evidence.76 Such cognitive dissonance is resolved by either rejecting 
the information or reconciling differences through a process of motivated reasoning, which moulds the in-
formation to fit existing views and values.77 Lakoff’s cognitive linguistics research has shown that negating 
a frame actually activates and strengthens that frame, leading to undermining the opposing view.78 Anoth-
er reason why refuting the claims within the frames employed by right-wing populists on immigration is 
futile and may even backfire, is that these often only play on emotive and visceral concerns,79 and as such 
provide no basis for factual or technical contestation.80  
Human rights advocates generally start from the liberal premise that pluralism – in terms of diversity of val-
ues, opinions, and social groups – is a good thing,81 and that there is no ‘Other’, rather there is only ‘us’, hu-
man beings who have rights.82 This is a worldview for which they often take support for granted.83 Human 
rights claims may be viewed as political demands in the broadest sense.84 Invoking human rights challeng-
es the status quo and confronts power structures, hierarchies, and privilege, with a conviction that people 
should be treated as equals who are entitled to essential freedoms.85 The fact that human rights are not 
only used to fight for social justice but are sometimes also employed as tools of oppression and rhetorical 
cover to justify international intervention arguably points to their normative appeal.86 In post-communist 
Eastern European countries, the anti-liberal critique argues that human rights are problematic legal norms 
because their promotion of equality undermines the common good, protecting the rights of once margin-
70  Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Populism and the Question of How to Respond to It’ (Oxford Handbook of Populism, 2017) 498; Goodwin, Right 
Response – Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe (Chatham House, 2011) xii-xiii.
71  Sombatpoonsiri, ‘Rethinking Civil Resistance in the Face of Rightwing Populism’ (2018) 13(3) JPD 8.
72  Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’ (2017) 9 JHRP.
73  McEntire, Leiby, and Krain, ‘Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromo-
bilization’ (2015) 109(3) APSR; Davis, Murdie, and Garnett-Steinmetz, ‘“Makers and Shapers”: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion’ (2012) 34(1) 
HRQ; Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan, Communicating Strategically about Immigrant Integration (MPIE, 2019).
74  Chong, ‘Framing strategies for economic and social rights in the United States’ in Borer (ed) Media, Mobilization, and Human Rights: 
Mediating Suffering (Zed-Books, 2012) 123.
75  Ibid, 124.
76  Banulescu-Bogdan, When Facts Don’t Matter – How to Communicate More Effectively about Immigration’s Costs and Benefits (MPI, 2018) 1.
77  Ibid; Encyclopedia Britannica, Cognitive Dissonance.
78  Lakoff, The All New: Don’t think of an elephant! – Know your values and frame the debate (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2014) xii.
79  Boswell, ‘Research, ‘Experts’, and the Politics of Migration’ in Ruhs, Tamas, and Palme (eds) Bridging the Gaps, (OUP, 2019) 21.
80  Key Informant Interview with HCLU Staff Member, Skype, 27.08.2020.
81  Nieuwenhuis, ‘The Concept of Pluralism in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 3(3) ECLR 384.
82  Ignatieff (n8) 225.
83  Alston (n72) 12; Chong (n74) 124.
84  Goodhart, ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Contestation’ in Goodale (ed) Human Rights at the Crossroads (OUP, 2012) 32-33.
85  Ibid, 33.
86  Ibid, 38,41.
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alised but now privileged groups.87 Yet, invoking human rights and the rule of law not only constrains but 
also enables governmental power – hence populist governments often implement counter-constitutional 
reforms, instrumentally exploit the law, and manipulate legal institutions to enforce their executive power 
and oppress or punish dissent, leading to the development of ‘abusive constitutionalism’.88 
Thus, using a human rights frame for contestation requires careful reflection on some underlying concepts, 
an awareness of how human rights may have been instrumentalised in a given context, and how these 
norms may be perceived by certain segments of the public. NGOs are refining their approaches and doc-
umenting case studies, success stories, and toolkits to learn from each other how to better engage with 
communities.89 This paper contributes to this trend, as it examines a text produced by a Hungarian NGO, 
adopting an academic lens to analyse it. 
87  Blokker, ‘Populist Counter-Constitutionalism, Conservatism, and Legal Fundamentalism’ (2019) 15 ECLR 528.
88  Ibid, 531; Lacey Populism and the Rule of Law, WP28, LSE–III (2019) 13-14.
89  FRA, 10 keys to effectively communicating human rights, (EU, 2018); Gomez and Coombes, Be the Narrative (JustLabs, 2019); Rodrí-
guez-Garavito and Gomez, ‘Responding to the Populist Challenge’ in Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez (eds) Rising to The Populist Challenge A New 
Playbook for Human Rights Actors (Dejusticia, 2018).
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6. Methodology
The qualitative research approach chosen for this study is theoretically anchored in the (post)structural-
ist notion that our access to- and construction of reality is through the social practice of language.90 The 
DHA is a strand of critical discourse analysis that, as applied by Wodak, examines how political discourses 
construct positive self- and negative ‘Others’  through power-dependent semiotic means that are linked to 
the historical context in which they are produced.91 Wodak systematically demonstrates how right-wing 
populists in Europe instrumentalise certain minorities as scapegoats for prevailing woes and subsequently 
render these groups as a dangerous ‘Other’ and a threat ‘to us’.92 Wodak’s findings on how right-wing pop-
ulist discourse creates a ‘politics of fear’ provides a helpful basis for comparison to explore how HCLU’s text 
constructs an alternative discourse, and reframes threat-based arguments.
Reisigl and Wodak outline eight steps to be followed in order to apply the DHA. The first three steps are 
relevant to data collection and were followed in this study.93 The starting point was the selection of a text 
of interest (Step 3 of the DHA) – this is relevant because the themes in the selected text are what guided 
and informed the focus of the data collected for Step 1 and 2 and not vice versa. The four thesis collec-
tions developed by HCLU caught my attention as a refreshingly unusual way to frame and address topics 
related to threat narratives about refugees in the polarised political context of Hungary. I translated the 
text from Hungarian into English, and downsized it, selecting three out of the four collections to focus on: 
Human rights and Security, Religious Attire, and Integration and Parallel Societies, as these relate most clearly 
to threat narratives propagated in Hungary and/or Europe. The topics of the fourth collection, School and 
Immigration, are not linked to visceral fears about the imminent arrival of foreigners. 
Here, a limitation of the study should be noted in relation to the selection of a single text, rather than a 
range of texts, which would perhaps better demonstrate how discursive practices constitute and change 
the social world.94 However, the chosen approach enabled the discourse analysis to obtain a certain depth 
within a limited timeframe, which would have otherwise not been possible with the inclusion of several 
texts for a comparative analysis. The selected texts guided the desk-based research (Steps 1 and 2 of the 
DHA). 
To get a better understanding of the context in which HCLU developed and presented the texts to a public 
audience, I conducted a semi-structured key informant interview95 with a staff member of HCLU who was 
involved in organising the series of public talks related to the published texts. A limitation of the quality of 
information that the key informant was able to provide is that the talks took place more than three years 
ago, thus the individual could not recall some details about the course of the talks, e.g., audience inter-
jections. Furthermore, the talks were not live streamed/recorded and put online, thus no responses were 
posted, which could have been analysed in this study. 
In line with Step 4 of the DHA, based on the literature reviewed and skimming of the text a research question 
was specified, and related assumptions were formulated. ‘How does the text published by HCLU construct 
an alternative discourse to the ‘Othering’ right-wing populist discourse on refugees, which capitalises on 
the threat narratives of the securitisation of migration?’ It is assumed that regardless of what the intention 
of HCLU was when writing the text, exploring the patterns in the text may reveal a discourse that counters 
some of the arguments of the threat-based discourse by situating components of these arguments within 
the framework of human rights. 
In Step 5 of the DHA, discourse topics were identified based on themes within the text and visualised in a 
diagram (Figure 1). This was followed by an examination of five discursive strategies guided heuristically by 
the DHA’s five questions (Table 3).  Following Step 6 of the DHA, the text was analysed in detail with par-
ticular attention paid to intertextual and interdiscursive relationships – how the text draws on elements of 
earlier texts or communicative events, reframes them and combines different discourses, potentially lead-
90  Wodak and Meyer (n14) 5; Jorgensen and Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (SAGE, 2002) 8-9.
91  Wodak, The Politics of Fear – What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (SAGE, 2015) Ch.3.
92  Ibid.
93  Reisigl and Wodak, ‘The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)’ in Wodak and Meyer (eds) Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis (SAGE, 
2001) 96.
94  Jorgensen and Phillips (n90) 89.
95  Bernard, Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches (Altamira Press, 2011).
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ing to the destabilisation of earlier patterns in a hegemonic struggle that challenges dominant meanings.96 
Step 7 of the DHA comprises the formulation of critique “based on ethical principles such as democratic 
norms, human rights and criteria of rational argumentation.”97 As these principles are the very ones which 
guide HCLU’s discourse, the ‘critique’ in this study is rather made up of some reflections on why the alter-
native discourse and HCLU’s approach may or may not be an effective way to counter right-wing populist 
threat-based discourse on refugees. However, an assessment of the alternative discourse’s actual efficacy 
was beyond the scope of this paper. 
Attempting to remain faithful to Step 8 of the DHA, the study has been shared with HCLU in the hope 
that the findings, which build on current understandings of communicating about human rights in the 
context of widespread right-wing populist rhetoric, may inform the construction of some of HCLU’s future 
discourses. If this study thus fosters new or just more nuanced types of thinking, and is deemed plausible 
to the community of scholars, it may be considered as complying with the (not uncontested) validity criteria 
of fruitfulness and coherence.98 
96  Jorgensen and Phillips (n90) 73-76,140.
97  Reisigl and Wodak (n93) 119.
98  Jorgensen and Phillips (n90) 172.
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7. Data Analysis
Between January and March 2017, HCLU organised a series of four public talks with the participation of 
experts from different disciplines under the umbrella title: Our Neighbour, the Refugee. The stated aim was 
to explore the obligations of a fundamental freedoms-respecting State in the context of increased immi-
gration and integration of people from different cultural backgrounds. Each talk was accompanied by a 
thesis collection published in advance online and used to guide the panel discussion during the events. 
Interviewing the HCLU staff member provided insight into the context of the four-part event series. Seeing 
the government’s inability to deal with the 2015 influx of mixed migration, HCLU wanted to explore if it 
should expand its field of work to support refugees. To this end, they compiled the thesis collection choos-
ing topics in which they had expertise, and which were also relevant to refugees. The talks were intended 
as a public technical exchange among experts. Hence, the target audience was not the wider public, but 
professionals – lawyers, social workers, religious figures – interested in getting an in-depth understanding 
on the topics; attendance was 40-50 people per talk. The theses were read out by the moderator to guide 
the panel discussion throughout the talks. The three thesis collections selected for this analysis are sum-
marised below.
Table 1: Key points of HCLU’s theses
Human Rights and Security
•	 The government links refugees and terrorism to stoke fear and justify exceptional measures 
and special powers to cope with them.
•	 Human rights protect the freedoms and dignity of the individual – terrorism does not enjoy 
any human rights protection.
•	 Restricting constitutionally protected conduct cannot provide the solution to problems caused 
by acts, which do not enjoy legal protection. 
•	 The State must be able to take care of its counter-terrorism obligations within legal frame-
works, without any special powers.
•	 The law must clearly lay down the conditions and the ways in which interference in rights may 
be applied, so the individual is protected in the face of arbitrary exercise of power. Hungarian 
regulations for secret surveillance aiming to counter terrorism and protect national security do 
not meet these requirements.
•	 The government’s argumentation puts the protection of individual freedom in direct opposi-
tion to the interest of security, when fundamental rights a priori protect the individual’s secu-
rity.
•	 Everyone’s privacy must be protected to allow the individual to live with rights.
Religious Attire
•	 Modern societies are characterised by a diversity of creeds. The state is not allowed to discrimi-
nate between individuals based on religion or culture.
•	 Immigration poses multiple problems to be resolved through serious deliberation – one of 
these is the external display of religious or cultural affiliation.
•	 The regulation of religious appearances belongs under the same constitutional principles that 
have thus far regulated similar conflicts arising from coexistence within our pluralistic societies.
•	 Freedom of conscience encompasses the freedom to express convictions non-verbally – or not 
to do so. The expression of beliefs in public spaces cannot be restricted as long as it is non-vio-
lent, does not cause harm to others, and is not unlawful.
•	 The State must ensure and promote the exercise of freedom of conscience and religion in its 
judicial system and in its law enforcement.
•	 The State must ensure the equal dignity of students and their religiously neutral and non-dis-
criminatory education.
Integration and Parallel Societies
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•	 Underlying the arguments of those warning about the dangers of parallel societies is that the 
appearance of any foreign groups is not desirable.
•	 We believe that societal diversity is fundamentally a good thing: it leads to development if dif-
ferent types of people meet and shape public affairs.
•	 Everyone is equal before the law. Laws apply to everyone equally. The State must respect it in all 
its actions the prohibition of discrimination.
•	 It is the State’s task to maintain public order and enforce the law through the police and other 
authorities. The State cannot allow that anywhere within its territory alternative law enforce-
ment powers take care of maintaining public order.  
•	 After the passage of a reasonable amount of time, those non-Hungarian nationals who reside 
long term in Hungary with the intention of permanent settlement, should have the possibility 
to participate in public affairs.
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‘Fields of action’ along with their corresponding functions and (sub-)genres indicate the segments of social 
reality that frame a discourse. To locate the field(s) of action into which the analysed text and the context of 
its presentation to a public audience falls, five fields of action were mapped out, representing human rights 
NGO action, drawing on the information about HCLU’s work on its website, as well as my own experiences 
of having worked in two NGOs in the past; the model is based on Reisigl and Wodak’s eight fields of political 
action (Table 2).99 Analysis of the context that the thesis collections were developed for and the content 
of the theses themselves, revealed which fields of action the text belongs to, and which discourse topics 
feature the most prominently in them (Figure 1). Further in-depth analysis of the text has provided some 
answers to DHA’s heuristic questions (Table 3).
99  Reisigl and Wodak (n93) 90-91.
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Table 3: Selected categories to analyse in HCLU’s discourse about refugees
Questions Discursive Strategies Purpose










Social actors: government, State, public, majority, individual, 
church, terrorists, refugees, foreigners, immigrants, minorities, 
citizen, national, HCLU, we, our, everyone/body, people, society, 
children, parents, police, authorities, organisations
Objects, phenomena, events: right(s), values, interests, free-
dom of: conscience, religion, thought, expression; equality; so-
ciety, culture, religion, conviction, law, rules, regulations, preju-
dice, principles, attire, pluralism, public order, peace, nationality, 
French Revolution, constitution, country, city, territory, Hunga-
ry, Western-Europe, institution, duty, obligation, security, power, 
emergency, threat
Actions, processes: vigilantism, immigration, integration, sur-
veillance, protection, restriction, repression, violence, prohibi-
tion, coexistence, segregation, compliance, law enforcement, 
argumentation, coercion, infringement, naturalisation, migra-
tion, national consultation
What characteris-
tics, qualities and 
features are at-








Social actors: society: democratic, modern, host, surveilled; Gov-
ernment/State: decent, secular, totalitarian, authoritarian, neu-
tral; citizen/national: peaceful, (non-)Hungarian; organisations: 
extreme(ist); people: religious, Roma, different types, (non-)sen-
tenced; those who: warn about dangers, trust the current gov-
ernment, commit crimes, belong to cultures which differ from 
the majority, live a life that differs from the conventional, exer-
cise their freedoms, are arriving/entering, reside: in official State 
institutions/outside the territory/long-term in Hungary
Objects, phenomena, events: right(s): individual, (basic) hu-
man, fundamental; values: constitutional, new, protected, so-
ciety: democratic, parallel, host; attire: religious, prescribed, 
cultural; principle: legal, important, moral, strict, constitutional; 
culture: European, emergent, differs from the majority, different; 
life: religious, full human
Actions, processes: protection of: security, border, (individual) 
freedom, human rights, privacy; surveillance: secret, unchecked, 
far-reaching, total, absolute, represses; restriction: duly substan-
tiated, inappropriate, unnecessary, disproportionate
Which arguments 






Persuading addressees of the truth and normative 
rightness of claims
Claims of State obligation: uphold rule of law & apply equally, 
prevent terrorism within legal framework /without special pow-
ers, be neutral, respect principles of non-discrimination & pro-
portionality, protect
Claims of fundamental rights: serve public security, protect the 
individual, can only be restricted with regard to the principle of 
proportionality and due substantiation of necessity










Positioning HCLU’s point of view and expressing involve-
ment or distance 
Constitutional values/democracy, modern, Western-type, so-
cietal/cultural diversity/pluralism, European standards, secular 
State, everybody’s privacy protected 
versus
Authoritarian, government’s unrestricted ability to interfere, 
hostile, humiliating, surveilled society, vigilantism of extremist 
organisations, restriction/violent repression of freedoms, 
Are the respective 
utterances articu-
lated overtly, are 






Examples of modifying the illocutionary force of utterances 
Intensification: 
Topos of State obligation (deontic): “The State must be able to 
take care of its counter-terrorism obligations within legal frame-
works”
Topos of suspicion: “it is always suspicious when the government 
often refers to terrorism, exceptionality, and emergency”
Topos of fallacy: “it cannot be assumed that everyone entering 
Hungarian territory is a criminal” “The duel between liberties 
and the competing public interests is not simply a zero-sum 
game”
Mitigation: 
Topos of acknowledgement: “integration of individuals who have 
a different religion or culture is sometimes a bit difficult.” “The 
expression of conviction…may create many types of situations 
that give rise to conflict”
Topos of suspicion: “the so-called ‘terror-danger-situation’”
Based on the above, I contend that there are three building blocks, which carry the articulation of the al-
ternative discourse constructed through HCLU’s theses. These are outlined in the following three sections.
7.1 Reframing Threat Narratives
The first building block relates to how HCLU reframes perceived threats linked to refugees and shows them 
from a completely different perspective. From Tables 2 and 3 it becomes evident that the two dominant 
discourse topics and the basis of HCLU’s claims revolve around fundamental rights/freedoms and the gov-
ernment’s or State’s obligations to respect and uphold these. This situates HCLU’s conviction that every 
human being is equally entitled to enjoy and exercise fundamental rights and freedoms, which the govern-
ment must not only refrain from infringing on unduly but must also uphold in all its actions. This is under-
pinned by the intensification of utterances, 32 instances of which relate to government or State obligations 
and actions, while 14 of which regard fundamental rights – out of a total of 65 identified intensifications. 
State obligations in this context can be understood as legally, socio-politically, or morally imposed duties, 
which constrain, compel, or bind a State to act and exclude certain reasons as justifications for non-perfor-
mance, due to a contract, promise, or social responsibility.100 This starting premise puts the State and the 
government of a constitutional democracy centre stage as the key actor with power and agency that it 
must use appropriately, as well as duties and responsibilities which it must meet. This may already startle 
the reader or the audience who, based on the title of the series, Our Neighbour, the Refugee, would likely 
expect refugees to be the focus. 
100  Pufong, ‘State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law’ (2001) 29(3), P&P 483; Himma, ‘The Ties that Bind: An Analy-
sis of the Concept of Obligation’ (2013) 26(1) RJ 17.
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Thus, instead of directly engaging with- and refuting the government’s propaganda that refugees/immi-
grants are criminals/terrorists and/or increase the risk of terrorism/crime, the reader is made aware that it 
is actually part of the government’s regular everyday tasks to monitor, prevent, and counter the threat of 
terrorism, “a certain degree of [which] prevails at all times”. Furthermore, the government has legal means 
with which it can check who is arriving on Hungarian territory to ensure appropriate controls. Using the to-
poi of suspicion and State obligation, the reader is encouraged to question the validity of the government’s 
argumentation that justifies the need for special powers. Thus, the invocation of a state of emergency to 
cope with a larger influx of mixed migrants is framed as the failure of the government to be able to fulfil 
its basic tasks. Employing the topos of acknowledgement, HCLU explicitly does not contest that national 
security and public safety may be legitimate goals of legal restrictions, but it maintains that the latter must 
be implemented only for a limited time with due regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
Thus, HCLU is not dismissive of people’s fears related to terrorism and its perceived link to refugees/immi-
grants, but rather addresses these from a completely different perspective. 
HCLU applies the same approach to address people’s fears regarding the challenges of immigrant integra-
tion and the creation of parallel societies. Using the topos of acknowledgment, HCLU admits that integra-
tion is not an easy process, but highlights the State’s obligation to enforce the law in every quarter of the 
cities within its territory. Using the topos of State failure, HCLU claims that allowing vigilantism means that 
the government is unable to maintain the rule of law. Furthermore, HCLU highlights that the law applies to 
everyone equally, therefore, anyone who causes harm to others, even if it is culturally or religiously accept-
ed, must be prosecuted in accordance with the law, respecting the principle of non-discrimination. Here 
again, the onus is on the State, rather than the refugee/immigrant, while acknowledging and addressing 
the public’s fear. 
Regarding the fear of ‘incompatible’ religions, HCLU points out that respect for freedom of conscience to-
gether with constitutional principles (e.g., equality, non-discrimination, State neutrality, proportionality) 
have provided adequate solutions to conflicts that arise from the expression of convictions and coexis-
tence in a pluralist society and that these are appropriate tools to address potential future challenges in 
this area. Thus, HCLU again employs the topos of acknowledgement – conflicts may arise – but couples this 
with the topos of history, mentioning that the principle of equality harks back to the French revolution – 
implying that it is part of the very European culture that the government claims to protect – and that in the 
past these tools were used to settle conflicts between Catholics, Calvinists, Jews, and Atheists. 
7.2 Making Human Rights Relevant for Everybody
The second building block which carries a part of the articulation of HCLU’s alternative discourse is how it 
demonstrates that human rights are relevant for everybody. A simple statistical examination of the theses 
reveals that ‘refugees’ are mentioned explicitly only eight times along with 11 nominations such as, ‘im-
migrants’, ‘foreigners’, and ‘Roma people’, while neutral nominations of social actors such, as ‘individual(s)’, 
‘people’, ‘citizen(s)’ and inclusionary nominations, such as ‘everyone’, ‘everybody’, ‘we’, and ‘our’ collectively 
feature approximately 70 times. The impression this creates is that the fundamental rights being discussed 
are not simply for the protection of the ‘Other’ but for everybody on Hungarian territory.101 
This impression is validated by some of the rights that HCLU highlights, such as the right to privacy in the 
context of government surveillance. Using the topos of fallacy in multiple ways, HCLU argues it is wrong to 
assume that unrestricted surveillance is acceptable, mentioning that Hungarian regulations for secret sur-
veillance to counter terrorism and protect national security do not clearly lay down the conditions, cases 
and the ways in which interference in the fundamental right to privacy may be applied, which also impacts 
the extent to which the individual is protected appropriately in the face of arbitrary exercise of power. This 
is likely also a reference to the case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary in which the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled in 2016 that the Hungarian legislation on secret anti-terrorist surveillance introduced in 2011 
did not provide sufficient safeguards to avoid abuse.102 It should be noted however, that currently no Coun-
cil of Europe member state has a system of oversight, which fully meets internationally recognised princi-
101  Kapronczay and Kertész, ‘The Crackdown on NGOs as an Opportunity to Reinforce Human Rights Values: A Hungarian Case Study’ 
Rising to The Populist Challenge (2018) 59; Alston (n72) 6.
102  European Court of Human Rights, Judgement of the Case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 37138/14, 12.01.2016.
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ples of good practice.103 Yet, the fact that the plaintiffs in that particular case were Hungarian, foregrounds 
HLCU’s claim that the privacy of “those who have nothing to hide” also needs to be protected. HCLU uses 
the topos of consequences to argue that “in a surveilled society […] new values, ideas, beliefs, scientific 
perspectives unfold much less freely”. This should demonstrate that protecting human rights is relevant for 
‘regular’ Hungarians too. 
Regarding freedom of conscience and religion, as well as its non-verbal expression, HCLU highlights that 
“as long as the expression of our beliefs and convictions is peaceful, non-violent, and non-coercive, the 
State must protect it, and everyone else – expressing their own opinion in a peaceful, non-violent, and 
non-coercive manner – must tolerate it.” This inclusive wording, not only reflects the language of Article 
9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights,104 but also shifts the connotation of the expression 
of religious convictions away from the Islamic headscarf to something neutral and relatable, one level 
above specific examples, to a ground of commonality.105 This is further underscored by highlighting the 
State’s obligation to be neutral in matters concerning religion – a principle and a classic tenet of liberalism 
also established by the European Court of Human Rights,106 though not explicitly described as such in the 
text. Furthermore, by citing different contexts in which freedom of religion can be exercised and must be 
ensured by the State with limited restrictions, e.g., in the judicial system, schools, and the church, HCLU 
makes the reader aware of the impact that limiting this freedom would have consequences in multiple 
arenas of life that are relevant to Hungarians. In general, the way HCLU presents rights, raises awareness 
on the distinction between a) reasons for rights, b) rights as legal positions and relations – that is, rights to 
something, liberties, and powers – and, c) the enforceability of rights.107 Figure 2 provides an overview of 
HCLU’s intertextual reframing of right-wing populist-propagated threats and fears.
7.3 Absent Elements
The third building block pertains to that which was omitted – certain sensitive topics, facts, and strategies 
of persuasion – in other words, that, which could have been part of an alternative but is absent from the dis-
course and therefore supports it. Closely linked to making human rights relevant to everybody, is the omis-
sion of any mention of refugee rights or reference to refugee law in general. The key informant mentioned 
that this was simply because HCLU did not have refugee-related expertise, and therefore stayed clear of such 
specifics. However, in a polarised context like Hungary, it may actually help to start a dialogue if the fact that 
refugees have certain rights is consciously not highlighted because that could be viewed as privileging the 
rights of ‘the stranger’ over those of the citizen108 or as the ‘Other’ ‘imposing’ its rights on Hungary even if it 
is the government that has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, focusing on the laws that apply to 
all may therefore be a good starting point, and also a way to reduce (well-intended) ‘othering’. The omission 
of any reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention is part of a wider pattern of omitting references to inter-
national legal obligations. Only two references are made to ‘European standards’ and ‘European legal com-
mitments’ without much elaboration, and not mentioning that there are EU laws that Hungary is obliged to 
respect. This is probably wise, given the aggressive anti-EU /Brussels campaign of the FIDESZ government, 
and the perception that the EU is forcing its liberal migration policies onto all its Member States. Similarly, 
no mention was made regarding refugees’ right under international law to enter a territory irregularly to 
seek asylum without being penalised. This would highlight the ‘uncomfortable truth’ that the universality 
of human rights obligations seems to collide with State sovereignty,109 and control over borders has certain
103  Wills, Democratic and effective oversight of national security services (Council of Europe, 2015) 7; FRA, Surveillance by intelligence services: 
fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the European Union, (EU, 2015) 4-7.
104  Sajó and Uitz, ‘Freedom of Religion’ in Rosenfeld and Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, 2012) 
917.
105  Gomez and Coombes (n89) 25; Shadid and van Koningsveld, ‘Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf’ (2005) 16(1) JIS, 36.
106  Ringelheim, ‘State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights Ap-
proach’ (2017) 6(1) OJLR 24.
107  Alexy, ‘Rights and Liberties as Concepts’, (Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2012) 284-285.
108  Ignatieff (n8) 228.
109  Ibid, 227.
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limits since asylum seekers are among the few who are permitted by law to trespass borders irregularly. 
Furthermore, the key informant mentioned that HCLU generally stays clear of citing international legal 
obligations because it does not interest most Hungarians and is therefore not a good tool of persuasion or 
argumentation – rather, they try to relate to the Hungarian context. 
Another absent element is the direct contestation of the factual accuracy of government propaganda. For 
example, citing statistics on how many refugees have been linked to acts of terrorism to disprove the no-
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tion that refugees pose a terrorism threat. Or commenting on the fact that the words ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum 
seeker’ were substituted by FIDESZ with migráns (migrant), a foreign-sounding imposition from Latin blur-
ring the distinction between different categories of arrivals,110 and that this is a word that people should 
not be swayed by. Contesting factual accuracy would not be helpful because it would be arguing using 
the same frame as the government, which according to Lakoff paradoxically reinforces the idea that is 
being disproved. Thus, while HCLU’s perspectivisation strategy does refer to the flawed argumentation of 
the government, it does so within a different frame that it develops in leading up to the reference. Linked 
to this point is that HCLU does not overtly ‘name-and-shame’ the government111 – it does not mention FI-
DESZ’s or Orbán’s name at all. While there are references to things that the government has done – stoke 
public fear via propaganda, pass surveillance legislation that violates legal requirements, allow vigilantism 
against Roma people, etc. – most references to government obligations are posited not in relation to the 
government concretely not meeting these obligations, but as duties of the government of any constitu-
tional democracy and the consequences if these are not respected. Arguably, this allows FIDESZ supporters 
to not ‘lose face’ and gives them a chance to revise their opinions without feelings of shame.112 Moreover, it 
refrains from fostering political polarisation by depicting FIDESZ as ‘the bad ones’ and HCLU and ‘the good 
ones’.113
Finally, an element that is crucially absent from the discourse is any attempt to persuade the audience that 
they should ‘welcome’ refugees. This applies to citing the economic benefits of receiving refugees (long 
term financial reward, labour force shortages, etc.), which would be countering directly or using the same 
frame of the government’s propaganda (refugees will steal Hungarians’ jobs), and may in any case not con-
vince as it does not address the main identity and security-based threats.114 Similarly, citing European or 
religious values to justify hospitality and generosity might also not be conducive as it may foster a certain 
level of volatility. This was evidenced by the ‘Refugees Welcome’ movement during the 2015 ‘September 
Fairy-tale’ in Germany where volunteers welcomed refugees cheering, applauding, providing basic needs 
and showing gestures of hospitality –  an atmosphere which then turned sour quite quickly, especially after 
the New Year’s Eve sexual assaults committed by mixed groups of mostly North African asylum seekers, 
refugees, and migrants illegally residing in the country.115 Generosity – a word that belongs to the language 
of gifts116 – as well as hospitality and empathy depend both on the deservingness of the recipients and on a 
specific type of expected reaction of gratitude that lives up the emotional investment of the givers. This is a 
rather precarious relationship based on the repetition of an asymmetric pattern, which is reversed as soon 
as the image of deservingness is damaged.117 Thus, while it is indisputably important to tap into empathy 
when communicating about rights, the volatility of emotions should be kept in mind.118  
By way of critique, one topic which was present in the HCLU thesis collection but perhaps should be absent 
from an initial dialogue that seeks common ground, is advocacy for refugees and immigrants to eventually 
gain voting rights and participate in public life. Of course, this is an important aspect of integration and 
must be addressed, but right-wing populists often cite this as a danger, claiming that if too many (Muslim) 
immigrants and refugees are allowed entry and naturalisation, they may eventually outnumber and ‘force 
their ways’ onto ‘Christian Europe’ through the exercise of their political rights. Thus, arguably, this topic 
may not be conducive to initiate a constructive dialogue but would nevertheless be important to address 
further down the line.
110  Howden (n55).
111  Davis, Murdie, and Garnett Steinmetz (n73) 202.
112  Banulescu-Bogdan (n76) 2.
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8. Discussion
In general, if one views the HCLU thesis collections as a way to counter right-wing populist narratives, it 
can be viewed as a form of civic education, seeking to strengthen democratic beliefs.119 Clearly, both the 
legalistic language and argumentation as well as HCLU’s initial aim to have a ‘technical exchange’ about the 
selected topics mean that the way the alternative discourse is ‘packaged’ in the thesis collections is not fit 
for a wider, less educated or technically versed audience.120 It would have to be simplified and/or combined 
with a broader multi-pronged communication strategy, similar to the “HCLU is needed” campaign, which 
shows the human story and translates human rights into ‘bite-sized’ concepts.121  Nevertheless, there are 
five overarching takeaways that can be learned from the articulation of this alternative discourse: 
1) Reframing threat narratives completely rather than directly countering them is key to providing a 
fresh perspective and not reinforcing preconceived notions.
2) Shifting the focus away from refugees and their rights to general human rights obligations of the 
State may be a good way to initiate a dialogue, because it arguably reduces the (positive) ‘othering’ of 
refugees and the perception of externally imposed responsibility to the duties of an internally elected 
social actors.
3) Addressing the things people fear or perceive as threats as well as acknowledging that certain pro-
cesses, like integration, are indeed difficult ensures that people’s concerns are not dismissed and is-
sues are not presented through ‘rose-coloured glasses’, which may counter the perception that ‘the 
elite experts’ deliberately avoid engaging with ‘the people’s’ concerns.
4) Highlighting that the majority, not only the minorities in a society have a stake in human rights may 
make people less weary of NGOs and civil society while also raise their awareness to instances when 
their own human rights are on the line.
5) Being aware of the context and propaganda messaging should inform decisions on what to strate-
gically leave out of a discourse – this is not to suggest that human rights communications should be 
tailored to populist politics, but rather that to start a dialogue, focusing on rights and values that affect 
the broader community might be more conducive than to go straight to ‘sensitive’ topics.122
The potential of this alternative discourse to feed into transformation has to be assessed in light of the 
wider political context of Hungary. The tactical pragmatism of findings 1, 2, 3, and 5 assumes the values of 
liberal democracy and may therefore possibly be impotent in the political climate of countries like Hun-
gary and may even have some unintended consequences in the long run. Finding 4 may be viewed as 
inconsistent with the assumptions of liberal democracy, which seeks to employ law for the protection of 
minorities with an implicit understanding of the structural privilege of the majority and the concomitant 
obligations of this status.123 When the key informant was asked whether reframing threat narratives the 
way HCLU has done has the potential to enable a more constructive dialogue on the topic of refugees, they 
were unpersuaded: not because the discourse does not successfully provide an alternative, but because 
the topic and the refugee label124 are so over-politicised in Hungary, absent forums for local debates or a 
platform to reach a larger audience through the government-controlled mainstream media which could 
give the alternative discourse a chance to get the upper hand in the hegemonic struggle to challenge the 
dominant discourses. 
Even among the relatively like-minded audience of the HCLU talks the topics elicited different perspec-
tives. Furthermore, the government keeps finding new scapegoats to stoke layer after layer of fear, which 
is difficult to strip away. However, there are different levels on a spectrum among FIDESZ supporters, which 
means that some could be swayed by an alternative framing since they do not support all aspects of the 
FIDESZ’s policies. Furthermore, and to end on a more hopeful note, while it is evident that NGOs lack the 
political power to desecuritise the topic of migration without the support of the judiciary, parliamentary 
opposition, and the media, the presence of an alternative discourse and frame may provide a basis for a 
slightly more measured and constructive dialogue on the topic, which in turn may contribute to further 
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desecuritisation attempts.125
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9. Conclusion
This paper applied the DHA to examine how a selected text published by a Hungarian NGO constructs 
an alternative discourse to the ‘Othering’ right-wing populist threat narratives on refugees and explored 
what can be learned from this alternative articulation. To this end, the core elements of populism were 
identified in accordance with an ideational definition to show that nationalist right-wing populists claim 
to speak and act in the name of ‘the people’ and oppose ‘the corrupt elite’ who want to impose pluralism 
against ‘the people’s will’. The securitisation of migration, including the ‘war on terrorism’, was highlighted 
as feeding into this rhetoric, because this positions migration as an existential threat – stoking fears among 
the public – and institutionalises securitised policy responses to control migration. In Hungary, Orbán’s 
anti-migration campaigns and policies in relation to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ have had severe repercussions 
on refugee protection in terms of lack of access to asylum, negative public attitudes towards refugees and 
immigrants, as well as restrictions on civil society. The literature revealed consensus in that both the supply 
and demand side of right-wing populism must be addressed through meaningful engagement if it is to be 
countered. With a focus on human rights advocates’ efforts to reframe threat narratives and communicate 
refugee rights effectively, it became evident that certain assumptions – such as the liberal premise that 
pluralism is a good thing – underlying their challenge to the status quo requires reflection and awareness, 
to ensure that their communication is not inadvertently counterproductive, exclusionary, or ‘Othering’. 
This context situated HCLU’s work and allowed the analysis to demonstrate that three building blocks car-
ry the articulation of HCLU’s alternative discourse: reframing propagated threats in relation to the State’s 
obligations to uphold fundamental rights, making human rights relevant to everyone’s civil liberties, and 
omitting certain topics and strategies of persuasion, which could have been part of an alternative but are 
absent from the discourse. Five things can be learned from the alternative discourse: completely reframing 
threat narratives provides an unexpected fresh perspective, shifting focus away from refugees and their 
rights to human rights obligations of the State towards everyone in the country may be a good way to 
initiate a dialogue, addressing the things people perceive as threats as well as acknowledging that certain 
processes are indeed difficult ensures that people’s concerns are not dismissed, highlighting that the ma-
jority – not only the minorities – in a society have a stake in human rights may make people less suspicious 
of NGOs, and being aware of the context can inform decisions on what to strategically leave out of a dis-
course. 
These findings contribute to the literature on using human rights for contestation – much of which is 
non-academic, compiled by NGOs or policy institutes. The paper adopted an interdisciplinary approach, 
touching on political science and human rights law. Further investigation would be required through a 
communication sciences lens to assess the actual efficacy of this alternative discourse among various audi-
ences. While the topic of refugees in Hungary is over-politicised and the platforms for public debates and 
dissemination of alternative discourses are limited, making it difficult for one NGO’s alternative discourse 
to challenge the hegemony of the government’s dominant discourse, the building blocks and learnings 
identified through this research can provide some tools for others to initiate a more constructive dialogue 
about perceived threats associated with refugee.
